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The Neoliberal Governance of Global Labour Mobility:
Migrant Workers and the New Constitutional Moments of Primitive Accumulation
Hironori Onuki

Abstract
One feature of the “age of migration” in which we live has become an increasing movement of
labour from the Global South to North, mainly in “low-skill” and low-wage jobs. This article
examines how far and in what ways contemporary capital-driven migration-related policies in
labour-receiving and labour-sending states have shaped the subjectivity of transnational migrant
workers and their positioning in host societies. It does so through the notion of new
constitutional moments of primitive accumulation, which designates the production of social
spaces for the commodification of labour through the implementation of specific migration
policies by labour-receiving states in the Global North and which are reinforced by the interests
of labour-sending states in the Global South. By using this concept, especially with reference to
changes in Japan’s immigration policy since the early 1990s, I argue that the governance of
global labour mobility has not only separated migrant workers from their means of subsistence in
the home societies, but also constructed them as precarious subjects in the labour markets of the
host societies.
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INTRODUCTION
Global labour migration is not a historical novelty, but its forms and trends have shifted through
ongoing changes in the global political economy. Revolutionary developments in transportation
and communication technology, which have reduced the costs and enlarged the spatial range of
movement, have dramatically reconfigured the pattern of global labour flows while increasing
their scope and speed. The current conspicuousness of South-to-North and East-to-West
migratory flows marks a distinct shift from the North-to-South pattern characteristic of the
nineteenth century. In this context, the increasing transfer of labour from the developing to
developed economies, mainly in “low-skill” and low-wage jobs, has been a central features of
the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, which Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller call
the “age of migration.”1
Reflecting such current dynamics of global labour migration, this article primarily explores how
far and in what ways contemporary capital-driven migration policymaking in labour-receiving
and labour-sending states have shaped the subjectivity of transnational migrant workers and their
positioning in the host societies. It does so by incorporating Stephen Gill’s notion of “new
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constitutionalism”2 into a renewed understanding of what Marx called the “so-called primitive
accumulation.”3
Within the contemporary context of the predominance of the neoliberal orthodoxy in guiding the
formation of global governance, remobilized debates about Marx’s notion of primitive
accumulation underlines how this notion is vital in highlighting an ongoing process in which
capital must continuously constitute and reconstitute a basic ontological condition for
accumulation.4 On the other hand, Gill remarks that neoliberal globalization has largely been
secured through the rise of the “new constitutionalism” which refers to neoliberal economic
agreements and state policy reforms that “lock-in” the disciplinary power of capital and capitalist
advancements while posing challenges to democratic politics.
This article seeks to unite these conceptual discussions through a concept of new constitutional
moments of primitive accumulation. These moments designate the production of social spaces for
the commodification of labour through the implementation of specific migration policies by
labour-receiving states in the Global North, and are reinforced by the interests of labour-sending
states in the Global South. By using this concept, particularly through reference to changes in
Japan’s immigration policy since the early 1990s, I argue that the governance of global labour
mobility, increasingly ushered by the heightened power of capital and the disciplinary control of
neoliberal market norms, has not only separated migrant workers from their means of subsistence
in the home societies, but also constructed them as precarious subjects in the labour markets of
the host societies.
Since the end of World War II, Japan had long been thought to be immune from the globalization
of labour migration. Compared with most Western advanced industrial nation-states that
launched labour importing schemes to deal with the shortages of workers in the 1950s and 1960s,
Japan achieved rapid economic growth without relying on mass labour immigration in the 1960s
and 1970s. 5 The social history of Japan’s “miracle” industrialization had underlined the
understandings of the Japanese modern nation as a racially homogeneous entity and the
incorporation of culturally and ethnically different “others” as a serious threat to its social
security.
However, the sharp appreciation of the yen in the wake of the 1985 Plaza Accord and the
growing status of Japan in global and regional capitalism around that period attracted migrants
who sought employment opportunities overseas. At the same time, the escalation of labour
scarcity through the “bubble” boom of the Japanese economy generated a massive and rapid
influx of the so-called “unskilled workers” (tanjun rodosha) to Japan from abroad.6 Furthermore,
during the consequent economic recession, unskilled migrant workers had been a part of the
neoliberal transformation of capital-labour relations characterized by the deepening and
widening precariousness of labour through prolonging their stay in Japan.7 More recently, the
demographics of an aging population in Japanese society have also resulted in growing demands
for migrant workers to maintain economic productivity and secure elder care provision.
With these trends in mind, I develop the argument outlined above by drawing on my field
research of the everyday lives of migrant workers in Japan and the Philippines.8 The discussion
proceeds as follows. I first delineate a theoretical framework that drives my analysis here,
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particularly drawing attention to how the notion of the new constitutional moments of primitive
accumulation helps elucidate the dynamics in the neoliberal governance of global labour
migration. The article then turns to the two cases as the embodiment of such moments within the
recent restructuring of Japan’s labour immigration regime: (1) The acceptance of foreign trainees
under the development of Japan’s Industrial Training and Technical Internship Programs; and (2)
The introduction of Filipino care workers into the Japanese labour market through the JapanPhilippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).
The discussion highlights how these two moments have made the short-term rotating supply of
migrant workers possible by securing “cheap” and “disposable” labour under regimes of flexible
accumulation in the current era of neoliberal globalization. The global growth of precarious
employment and unprotected workers has become the emergent focus of critical scholars in the
field of international political economy.9 Drawing on this literature, and developing the notion of
new constitutional moments of primitive accumulation, this article aims to facilitate the analysis
of how neoliberal restructuring of the global political economy operates to diversify workforce
while heightening the segmentation of labour market on a world scale.

PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION, NEW CONSTITUTIONALIM,
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL LABOUR MIGRATION

AND

THE

Positing the political ideals of human dignity and individual freedom as “the central values of
civilization,” neoliberalism proposes that human wellbeing can be best guaranteed by the “free”
market.10 Critics argue to the contrary that the globalization of neoliberalism since 1970s has
often been closely associated with a crisis of social and economic reproduction.11 In particular,
the neoliberal restructuring of global governance has reignited debates among critical scholars
about Marx’s understanding of primitive accumulation to explain an intensified commodification
of life, nature and human knowledge and its impacts on the relations of production and social
reproduction.12
For Marx, primitive accumulation is “the historical process of divorcing the producer from the
means of production” in which “the social means of subsistence and of production are turned
into capital, and the immediate producers are turned into wage labour.”13 It therefore designates a
revolution in social property relations – processes of proletarianization through varied forms of
violent expropriation and the creation of capitalist modes of production and subsistence that lie at
its core. Derived from Marx’s conceptualization, recent discussions of this concept largely stem
from two different interpretative frameworks: one in which primitive accumulation represents a
time-defined and initial stage in the linear model of development (what Massimo De Angelis
terms “historical” primitive accumulation) and the other in which the concept signifies an
enduring feature immanent to capitalist social relations (what he refers to as “inherentcontinuous” primitive accumulation).14
The advocates of the historical primitive accumulation conception present the process of
“enclosures” 15 as the historical phase that arranged preconditions of the capitalist mode of
production.16 Primitive accumulation, distinctly separated from “capital logic” (or accumulation
proper), is considered to cease once the processes of expropriation create and consolidate

4
commodity market systems for labour-power, land and so on. However, such a confinement of
primitive accumulation to a question of genealogy within the temporal transition from feudalism
to capitalism is, as De Angelis aptly alleges, problematic theoretically and politically.17 While the
historical primitive accumulation framework theoretically obscures the clashes among various
social forces by conceiving capital as a totalized system rather than a force with totalizing drives
that exists together with other forces that act as limits on it, this approach politically downplays
the dynamics of collective and/or individual actions that contest and negotiate capitalist
development.
In contrast, those who explore the inherent-continuous primitive accumulation perspective
illustrate how primitive accumulation is not just a one-time phase in the founding of capitalism
that has been left behind, but rather an ongoing strategic problem in conflictual capitalist
relations. Thus, capital must continuously engage in this process to reconstitute a basic
ontological condition of accumulation. De Angelis’ re-reading of Marx’s critical political
economy concentrates on the fundamental ontological connection between primitive
accumulation and the expanded reproduction of the capital-relation. 18 In his view, whereas
accumulation proper and primitive accumulation in Marx’s theoretical edifice share the same
principle, the separation of people from the means that allow them to live and produce, these two
processes differ not substantively but in terms of the “conditions, circumstances and context in
which this separation is enforced.”19 The former signifies the constant proliferation of the same
separation. The latter encompasses the ex-novo separation primarily through the so-called “extraeconomic” form of power exercised by the state or particular sections of social classes,20 and
through an ongoing creation of a new social space for commodification, even in “mature”
capitalist economies, which has not yet acquired the fetishistic essence assumed by capital’s
normalization. Through the process of primitive accumulation, the prioritization of capital’s
accumulation within the doing of human activity (what De Angelis describes as “separating the
doing and the deed”) confront the challenges by the workers to protect social spheres of life from
capitalist commodity markets and to think of alternatives beyond capital.21
In other words, social contestations and struggles are constitutive and ongoing features of
capitalist relations of existence and accumulation. From this viewpoint, De Angelis conceives of
the neoliberal transformation of the global political economy as a form of the “new enclosure”
aimed at destroying the welfare or “social barriers” erected in the post-war era.22
David Harvey similarly renews the interpretation of primitive accumulation as ongoing
processes, exposing the inner contradictions of the “new” imperialism by attributing it to the role
of “spatial-temporal fixes”23 in the context of chronic problems of capital over-accumulation.
Pointing to the advent of neoliberal orthodoxy through which capitalists, backed by state powers
(as embedded in and symbolized by the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade
Organization), have “actively manufacture[d]” new realms of proletarianization and private
appropriation of public property even within the global core, Harvey regards privatization as the
cutting edge of “accumulation by dispossession,” which he substitutes for the term primitive
accumulation.24 It is noticeable here that, largely influenced by Harvey’s renaming of primitive
accumulation as “accumulation by dispossession,” the main focus of recent study from the
inherent-continuous primitive accumulation perspective has been the displacement of the large
number of people through capital-driven strategies of development in the Global South. Review

5
of African Political Economy, for instance, recently published a special issue that was concerned
with “a new wave of accumulation by dispossession in Africa” and, more specifically, how the
large-scale practices of land “grabbing,” often promoted by foreign capital intervention, is
shaping Africa’s political economy.25
Whereas both Harvey and De Angelis explicate primitive accumulation as continuously inherent
to capitalist relation of production and social reproduction, as Gillian Hart claims, there are key
differences between their conceptualizations, particularly derived from Harvey’s focus on
tendencies to overaccumulation and De Angelis’ primacy emphasis on the struggles of working
class. Hart further elaborates: “For Harvey contemporary struggles beyond the workplace
represent reactions to accumulation by dispossession, whereas for De Angelis they are active
constitutive forces.”26
These conceptual differences are important and much research stemming from Harvey’s
formulation has shed light on the contested impacts on capital- and state-led development
strategies on people’s everyday lives in the Global South. However, massive displacement of
people within the context of neoliberal globalization is not the only ways in which the ongoing
process of primitive accumulation has currently shaped the nature and contours of the global
political economy. What is crucial to underline here, as noted above, is that the ongoing process
of primitive accumulation also involves the continuous production of a new social space for
commodification in not only the underdeveloped capitalist economies of the Global South but
also the highly developed economies of the Global North. In a similar vein, Saskia Sassen
stresses that the study of contemporary versions of primitive accumulation needs to go beyond
logics of extraction in order to recover the “current systemic deepening of advanced capitalist
relations of production.”27
Thus, moving beyond the limits of Harvey’s “accumulation by dispossession” formulation, the
renewed interpretation of primitive accumulation as an ongoing process brings to light the ways
in which “primitive accumulation encompasses an enormous socio-spatial range of activities”28
and also the production of spaces within which they happen. Such a broader understanding of
primitive accumulation seemingly provides important insights in analyzing the multifaceted
dynamics of migratory labour flows on a transnational scale in at least two ways.
First, what seems so compelling about the idea of primitive accumulation as an inherentcontinuous strategy in diverse phases of capitalist development is its potential not to universalize
the specific structural qualities of capitalist relations, but instead to grapple with transnational
connection, that is, the divergent yet increasingly interconnected routes of socio-spatial change
generated through the importation of capitalist sociality across the international milieu.29 As De
Angelis contends, the continuous character of enclosures enables a critical reflection on the ways
in which “people of the North, East and South are facing possible phenomenally different but
substantially similar strategies of separation from the means of existence.”30
In this sense, the employment of this inherent-continuous primitive accumulation perspective, on
the one hand, helps to disclose how the series of neoliberal socio-economic structural adjustment
processes in developing societies are related to the transnational outflows of labour. On the other
hand, it also calls attention towards the ways in which states’ withdrawal from social
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provisioning in highly industrialized nations, as a response to the neoliberal transformation of
capitalist relations of production and social reproduction (along with the changes in the form and
nature of the family), has promoted the inflows of migrant workers to fill the needs of
workforces within the re-privatized segments of the labour market. As such, the re-reading of
primitive accumulation as an ongoing process invokes the endeavour to illuminate the
relationship between global labour migration and territorially differential experiences of
neoliberal restructuring of the global political economy, thereby elucidating how substantially
similar strategies of new enclosures guided by the power of capital and reinforced by states’
policies have generated phenomenally diverse impacts on different societies.
Another crucial contribution brought about by the understanding of primitive accumulation as a
persistent process for the study of the governance of global labour migration is its emphasis on
the discursive constitution of distinct subjects within the extensive and intensive frontiers of
accumulation mechanisms. With the enduring conflict between capital and labour, as De Angelis
puts it, primitive accumulation continues to function not only as a strategy to promote, preserve
and reassert capitalists’ aspiration to craft “life-worlds in its own image” in the face of resistance
but also as discourses to “integrate the social body in particular ways” by defining “new subjects
normalized to the capitalist market.” 31 Furthermore, Silvia Federici highlights how primitive
accumulation entails an “accumulation of difference and divisions within the working class”
through brutally planting hierarchies built upon gender as well as race and age in people’s
bodies.32 Such deep divisions, according to her, serve to “intensify and conceal exploitation.”33
These analyses suggest that the use of the inherent-continuous primitive accumulation
perspective opens up a path to explore the ways in which transnational migrant workers have
been discursively and materially constituted as particular subjects under specific migration
regimes in specific socio-economic locations. This exploration also helps to address the question
of how particular representations of migrant workers are implicated in the deepening of the
racialization and feminization of labour market segmentation along with the neoliberal
restructuring of capitalist relations of production and social reproduction. In this respect, to
complement the inherent-continuous primitive accumulation perspective and to better grasp
increasingly capital-market driven regulations of migrant labour flows from the Global South to
North and their implications for the subjectivity and positioning of migrant workers in the labour
markets of the host societies, it is useful to incorporate Gill’s notion of the “new
constitutionalism” into the current discussion of primitive accumulation.
Within the contemporary context of intensified globalization, Gill underlines that there has been
a neoliberal counter-revolution to marketize all human activities through facilitating
deregulation, privatization and the withdrawal of the state from many areas of social
provisioning, promoted by the structural forces of “disciplinary neoliberalism” and the “new
constitutionalism.” 34 The notion of disciplinary neoliberalism, on the one hand, is primarily
concerned with extending the alienation, exploitation and commodification of labour by
intensifying and deepening the scope of market disciplines associated with the structural power
of capital in organizing peoples’ everyday lives.
The enhancement of the structural power of capital coincides with a transition to the
geographically and temporally fragmented and decentralized re-organization of capital
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accumulation. 35 This highly exploitable system of flexible accumulation has transformed and
rationalized the welfare-state model of capital-labour compromise to reinforce the power of
capital while simultaneously degrading that of labour. Within the framework of disciplinary
neoliberalism, the accelerated push for greater flexibility in the labour markets has been a key
feature of global and national politico-economic reorganization of the social relations of
production. The flexibilization of labour markets means a redistribution of risks, which has
increased with the intensification of global competition, away from the state and capital towards
labour.36
In other words, the neoliberal imperative for labour market flexibility, accelerated and
legitimatized by the political ideals of possessive individualism and personal responsibility, has
extended and deepened the marginalization as well as exploitation of labour through such means
as driving down wages and expanding the pool of workers available for temporary and part-time
employment.37 This has also brought about the global proliferation of precarious employment
and unprotected workers.
These structural forces of disciplinary neoliberalism, as Gill further elaborates, have largely been
secured through their political-judicial counterpart, the “new constitutionalism.”38 According to
Gill, to fundamentally facilitate capital accumulation now and in the future, new
constitutionalism involves three interrelated sets of measures that shape neoliberal governance of
the global political economy and strengthen the power of capital: (1) Measures to reorganize
state apparatuses through not only the liberalization of trade and investment but also the
privatization of public resources and services, in a process that is underpinned by various legal
mechanisms including judicial review as well as multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements;
(2) Measures to create and expand capitalist markets by re-writing laws and statues to extend the
scope and scale of accumulation and to intensify the prerogatives of the holders of private
property rights over labour, environmental and other human rights; and, (3) Measures to maintain
de-politicization of the “economy,” especially within the management of the current crisis of
accumulation, through legitimating the removal of strategic economic policy from political
contestation while attenuating and co-opting popular democratic forces and potential opposition.
Building upon this understanding, Gill and Isabella Bakker demonstrate how the various
measures of new constitutionalism shift responsibility for social provisioning and risks onto
individuals and families.39 One outcome of this is the rise of care deficits or gaps within and
between societies that eventually promotes the transnational flow of migrant workers, especially
as care labour. Put alternatively, the currently dominant neoliberal governance of production and
social reproduction is steered by the forces of new constitutionalism, which increasingly relieve
capital of its contribution to collective care costs and promote restrictive macroeconomic
policies, resulting in the re-privatization and marketization of public care services.
Central to my analysis here is that the various measures of new constitutionalism promote the
regulatory power of market forces to reshape the nature of migration policies under the
disciplinary neoliberal regimes of global labour mobility at the expense of the human security of
migrant workers. As Michael Kearney remarks:
…the task of effective immigration policy is to separate labo[u]r from the jural
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persons within which it is embodied, that is, to disembody the labo[u]r from the
migrant worker. Capitalism in general effects the alienation of labo[u]r from its
owner, but immigration policy can be seen as a means to achieve a form of this
alienation that increases greatly in the age of transnationalism, namely the spatial
separation of the site of the purchase and expenditure of labo[u]r from the sites of
its reproduction, such that the locus of production and reproduction lie in two
different national spaces.40
That is, the marketization of labour migration governance, steered by the structural forces of new
constitutionalism, escalates the alienation and commodification of migrant workers by ignoring
wider social question about how this labour supply is produced and reproduced. Here, my aim of
integrating the new constitutionalism into the longue durée of primitive accumulation is to
demonstrate how the advancement of the new constitutionalist mechanisms has been occurring
within the geographical expansion and spatial-temporary rearrangement of capital accumulation.
More specifically, the development of the notion of what I call new constitutional moments of
primitive accumulation allows for a better understanding of the ways in which specific migration
policies of labour-receiving states in the Global North, endorsed by the interests of laboursending states in the Global South, have facilitated the production and expansion of social spaces
for the commodification of migrant workers while leaving these workers without effective means
of protecting themselves. Put alternatively, it highlights and contextualizes changing social
relations that to a large degree govern the everyday lives of migrant workers and shape their
subjectivities.
By using the notion of new constitutional moments of primitive accumulation, the next section
turns attention to the neoliberal restructuring of the Japanese labour immigration policies since
the 1990s. This conceptual approach helps to illustrate how the neoliberal shift towards more
capital-market oriented governance of global labour mobility promotes the discursive and
material constitution of migrant workers as precarious subjects in the labour markets of the host
societies.

NEOLIBERAL REFORMS TO JAPAN’S LABOUR IMMIGRATION REGIME
Historically speaking, Japan’s modern nation building and industrialization since the Meiji
Restoration in 1868 were no exception to the rule that capitalist economic development has
always relied on the migration of labour within as well as across national borders.41 After the end
of World War II, however, the dominance of conservative politico-economic leaders elided the
past, by promoting the self-image of Japan as a homogeneous unity to serve as its ruling political
instrument in defining the legal-practical management of Japanese nationality and citizenship
and considering the incorporation of the ethnically and culturally different “others” as a threat to
the harmony of its society. 42 While Japan’s Nationality Law, issued and enshrined in 1950,
determined national citizenship according to the patrilineal principle of jus sanguinis (“law of
blood”), 43 its Immigration Control Act, originally enacted in 1951, expressly prohibits the
transnational influx of unskilled labour to Japan.44

9
Nevertheless, particularly from the mid-1980s, when the term “internationalization” (kokusaika)
was widely, but vaguely, used as a dominant political slogan within the context of the global
expansion of the Japanese economy,45 the estimate number of migrant workers flowing to Japan
across its national borders had increased remarkably from 119,100 in 1986 to 600,700 in 1992.46
Although the proportion of these migrants in Japan was still the lowest among the major
advanced industrial nations, the rapidly augmented inflows of gaikokujin rodosha (literally
meaning, “foreign national workers,” intimately associated with unauthorized migrants from
underdeveloped, non-Western regions) became perhaps the most discussed social “problem” in
the late 1980s.47
In the second half of the 1980s, a marked escalation of labour scarcity with the onset of the
Japanese economy’s “bubble” boom induced the intensified streams of unskilled migrant
workers coming into Japan, mainly from other Asian developing nations, and generated a great
deal of debate on whether Japan should have embraced the growing cross-border influx of these
workers. 48 This dispute, regarded as a “first-round” debate on the basic direction of Japan’s
immigration policy,49 led the Japanese state to reform the Immigration Control Act in 1990. The
severe and persistent shortage of workers within the dramatic expansion of the Japanese
economy imposed difficulty especially on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in
manufacturing, construction and service industries, which were increasingly shunned by
Japanese workers because of their “bottom-wage” and “socially undesirable” – or “3K” (kiken,
kitsui, and kitanai – dangerous, difficulty, and dirty) – nature of jobs. Indeed, the stiffer market
competition through the neoliberal restructuring of the global political economy further
reinforced the need for low-cost and flexible labour among subcontracting firms within Japan’s
vertically organized industrial structure, known as the keiretsu system.50
Consequently, Japanese SMEs increasingly depended on migrant workers who were willing to
accept low wages and insecure working conditions. To ameliorate the acute demand for “cheap”
labour, the 1990 revised Immigration Control Act, though maintaining Japan’s post-war official
stance on the strict ban against the transnational immigration of unskilled workers, created ad
hoc means of recruiting migrants on a temporary basis under visa status recognized as nonemployment purposes. The first-round debate suddenly receded when the Japanese economy fell
into recession following the burst of its bubble boom in the early 1990s.
In the 1990s, Japan’s efforts to tackle its subsequent decade-long recession entailed the structural
and regulatory reforms of industrial organizations as well as employment patterns. In particular,
Japanese business leaders encouraged the flexibilization of the labour market in order to equip
firms with a greater ability to adjust labour costs and employment management according to
fluctuations in the global economy.51 Together with this push toward greater flexibility in the
Japanese labour market, the prospect for the impending absolute decline of Japan’s labour force
due to its “aging population” (koreika) and “dwindling birth rate” (shoshika) has triggered a
“second-round” dispute with the rekindled interest in the transnational immigration of unskilled
workers since the late 1990s. 52 For instance, the National Institute of Population and Social
Security Research projected that the population of the working-age (15-64) in Japan will drop
from its peak at 87.17 million in 1995 to 53.89 million in 2050.53 Under such salient sociodemographic trends, the Japan Business Federation (Nihon Keidanren),54 which is composed of
the leaders of Japan’s leading companies, has called for freer entry of migrant workers into Japan
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by emphasizing that “the diversity of a corporation’s own work force has become a source of
profitability” within the context of enhanced global market competition.55 For these employers of
Japanese large corporations, the role of unskilled migrant workers is no longer to simply fill in a
labour market gap but rather to function as a part of diversified and expanded flexible labour
supply.
Urged by the business circles, the Japanese state has seemingly attempted to expand yet strictly
monitor the transnational inflows of unskilled migrant labour. 56 Such paradoxical “migrant
profiling” projects57 with the aim of securing labour supply in a neoliberal regime of flexible
accumulation are exemplified by: (1) The acceptance of foreign trainees under the institution and
deregulation of Industrial Training and Technical Internship Programs; and, (2) The introduction
of Filipino care workers in Japan under the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA). By examining these two cases as the new constitutional moments of primitive
accumulation, the following discussion demonstrates how these two moments, reinforced by the
capital-led accumulation strategies of labour-sending states in the Global South, have constituted
migrant workers as precarious subjects in the Japanese labour market while severely limiting
their means to protect their human security.

Foreign Trainees under Japan’s Industrial Training and Technical Internship Programs
The present form of Industrial Training and Technical Internship Programs – hereafter, the
Training Programs – was launched with the creation of “trainee” as an independent visa status at
the 1990 revision of Japan’s Immigration Control Act. Their officially pronounced objective is to
foster the “development of human resources” in ways that would contribute to “economic growth
in developing countries and regions” through the transnational transfer of Japanese advanced
industrial and vocational skills. 58 Trainees are “supposed to conduct activities to learn and
acquire the technology, skills, or knowledge at public or private organizations in Japan.”59 The
“standard ordinances” released by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) define the skills to be imparted
through the Training Programs something that should not be attainable through the repetition of
simple manual tasks and that must be difficult or impossible to acquire in trainee’s countries of
origin.60 Thus, trainees are categorically distinguished from migrant workers employed in the
unskilled job sectors.
Nevertheless, after the establishment of the Training Programs, many SMEs, which suffered
most from the shortage of “cheap” labour under the condition of intensified global market
competition yet were unable to satisfy the strict requirements under the conduct of the Programs,
put mounting political pressure on the Japanese state to relax their qualification criteria.
Consequently, the state issued by-laws in 1990 and 1992 to significantly “deregulate” the
conditions for the acceptance of trainees and the implementation of the training.61 As a result, the
deregulated Training Programs have served as a means of unskilled migrant labour supply for
SMEs, most of which are too small to have sufficient capacity and knowledge to offer trainees
adequate training or transferable technologies. This is largely true for many of the host
companies that do not have any overseas trade or capital relations. For instance, a Japanese
mentor of Filipino trainees at a machine sheet metal factory explains his desire to teach these
trainees new skills but, at the same time, posits: “It is impossible for us to know what kinds of
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technologies and skills are needed in the Philippines.” 62 Moreover, the political scandal that
erupted in 2000 disclosed how the deregulation and subsequent expansion of the Training
Programs were encouraged through illegal political donations of more than $6 million 63 to
certain influential politicians by the then president of the KSD Foundation for Promoting the
Welfare of Independent Entrepreneurs.64
The main point in the deregulation of Japan’s Training Programs was the establishment of the
“association managed training” (AMT) scheme that enabled SMEs and small farms to invite
trainees through intermediary organizations (e.g. Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Small
Business Associations and Agricultural Cooperatives). Whereas the previous ordinances limited
the number of trainees to less than 5 per cent of company’s regular employees (meaning that a
firm with 20 employees could invite 1 trainee), the AMT scheme allowed an institution with 50
or fewer employees to accept 3 trainees per year.65 To monitor and facilitate the importation of
trainees through the AMT scheme, the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization
(JITCO) was created in 1991 as a semi-governmental institution with financial support from
private industries.66 Furthermore, the establishment of the Technical Internship Program in 1993
and its expansion in 1997 allowed trainees who complete one-year period of the Industrial
Training Program to master more advanced and practical skills through two-year “working”
experience in the production process, resulting in a maximum of three years for the Training
Programs.
Through these reforms of Training Programs directed at alleviating the conditions of trainee
acceptance and training practice, the annual number of people entering Japan as “trainees” more
than doubled from 43,649 in 1991 to 101,879 in 2008. It was remarkable that the number of
trainees under the AMT scheme rose from 2,537 in 1992 to 61,641 in 2008, accounting for more
than 90 per cent of those accepted through the JITCO-supported private channel.67 Within this
dramatic growth of trainees entering Japan, the overwhelming majority of trainees hail from Asia
(95.5 per cent in 2008).68 Since 1990, China has stood in first place with its rapidly growing
number comprising approximately two third of total acceptances and, more markedly, more than
80 per cent of JITCO-supported acceptances via the private channel. Other nationalities of
importance are Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. Among the industries in which trainees
are accepted through the deregulated AMT scheme, “garment and textile” has been the largest
proportion (19.9 per cent in 2008), followed by “food processing” (15.4), “agriculture” (10.3),
and “construction” (8.5). Most of the Japanese host companies under the AMT scheme are smallsized factories and farms: companies with less than 20 employees (40.3 per cent), those with 2049 (12.4 per cent), and those with 50-99 (13.3 per cent).69
The institution and enlargement of the Japanese Training Programs are largely characterized by
the shifts of regulatory power from the state toward private forces to reshape the nature and
operation of the Programs. As Ippei Torii aptly puts it, the privatization of regulatory authority
over the operations of the Training Programs has widened the contradiction between their real
practices and official justifications, that is, the temporary intake of unskilled migrant labour and
technology transfer through training.70 Here, at least four distinct features of ITTIPs make the
effective introduction of “cheap” migrant labour on a temporary basis possible under the current
regime of flexible accumulation.
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First, the Training Programs are designed as the rotating supply of trainees, secured by a
limitation on their training period to a maximum of three years. The rotation mechanism
prohibits the settlement of migrant workers in Japan and adjusts flexibly labour supply. Yet, it
may also cause some problems, including the huge administrative costs to promote and regulate
the returns of trainees to their countries of origin and the risk of incurring international criticisms
of egoism and/or exploitation – using trainees’ labour-power when needed while deporting them
when not needed. In this regard, as Tetsu Sano notes, the deregulation of the Training Programs
can be regarded as the institution that is adjusted to overcome efficiently these possible
constraints. 71 More specifically, the AMT scheme systematizes the regime in which private
receiving organizations and host companies, rather than the state, take responsibilities to
thoroughly ensure trainees’ return. Indeed, since the official objective of the Programs has
persistently been claimed as a part of Japan’s international development aid, their operations can
be presented as a way to alleviate international criticisms.
Second, the Training Programs institutionalize the supply of relatively “cheaper” labour than
other means to introduce migrant workers into Japan, since “training” is officially defined as
non-employment activity. Thus migrants entering the country under these Programs do not retain
any labour rights, including minimum-wage standards and freedom to change jobs. In fact,
trainees do not receive wages but only “training allowances” to cover their living expenses.
Since the state’s guideline simply indicates that the sum of compensation paid to trainees must be
“within an appropriate range,” it essentially depends on the discretion of host companies and
receiving organizations.72 Sonoko Kawakami notes that as the number of trainees has increased,
the average training allowance has declined yearly; under the AMT scheme, it shrunk from about
$713 per month in 1997 to $535 in 2008, 73 which was equivalent to a third of the starting
monthly salary standard for Japanese high-school graduates ($1,300). 74 Furthermore, though
technical interns (trainees proceed to the Internship Program) are allowed to earn wages
supposedly commensurable with those of their Japanese counterparts who undertake the same
jobs, their amount tends to be much lower: their average in 2007 was $1,000,75 as compared with
the above-noted starting income level among Japanese high-school graduates.
This trend is also echoed in the results of the survey conducted by JITCO that discerns how the
employers often determine technical interns’ wage-levels based on regional minimum-wage
standards, by disregarding their balance with the remunerations of Japanese employees.76 More
strikingly, Koichi Yasuda’s study in Gifu, one major trainee-receiving district known for the
concentration of garment and textile industries, finds that many Chinese trainees (according to
him, approximately 4,000 in 2006) earned a mere $2.5 an hour, worked more than 250 hours of
overtime per month, and were permitted one day-off in a month. In one interview, a garment
factory owner declared: “The garment and textile industry has been exposed to severely
intensified global economic competition. If we pay the Chinese the wages equivalent to the
Japanese workers, most firms will go bankrupt.” 77 As this comment reflects, the employers
appear to rationalize their manipulation of trainees as the source of “cheap” labour by not only
emphasizing the Training Programs as the means to transfer technology, but also by drawing on
their racially discriminatory bias against “foreign” workers.
Third, most trainees have signed very strict contracts with the receiving organizations prior to
their arrival in Japan. In many cases, these contracts include the stipulations that the trainees
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must obey their hosts’ instructions without question, and that they should not desist from the
Training Programs before the completion of their full period. More strikingly, many female
trainees are compelled to ratify the compulsory agreements that ban their possible pregnancy
during the training terms.78 These clauses give the Japanese receiving organizations and host
companies a significant degree of power over these trainees. The narrative of a female Chinese
trainee, Ting, 79 suggests how such unequal power relations make it possible for the physical
violence and coercive sexual assaults by employers as well as officials of the receiving
organizations that arrange their training to be ubiquitous. She came to Japan in 2004 with the aim
of “learning” agricultural technologies. However, she was not only forced to work as a domestic
care-giver at the house of the employer, but also sexually abused by him more than 60 times.
Though she managed to escape from the firm and rush into the Immigration Office after one year
and three months, she still suffers from severe PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), feeling
terror even at the sound of opening and closing doors.80
Finally, many trainees, particularly those coming from China and Vietnam, are saddled with
heavy debt because they are obliged to pay “guarantee deposits” to trainee-sending organizations
in their home countries, which they will lose if they resign from the Training Programs. For
instance, Cui, a Chinese who undertook his training at a pig farm in Kisarazu City, Chiba (the
suburb of Tokyo), deposited approximately $10,000. He managed to pay this excessive amount
of money by selling his parents’ land and house as well as borrowing money from relatives,
friends and a lender. Therefore, for Cui, together with many other trainees, a breach of contract
through abandoning their training and/or being deported means the ruin of their attempts to bring
their families out of poverty. Under the psychological and economic pressure to earn as much as
possible in Japan in order to pay off their debts and to ensure financial security for their families,
even when trainees have grave complaints, they continue to carry out the training, patiently
waiting for the end of their terms. This mentality is reflected among trainees who are terrified of
the phrase often used by their employers, “kikoku saseruzo” – which literally means “deport
you.”
Thus, the privatization of the Training Programs serves as a device in constraining the agency of
trainees to raise their voices against their unexpected and discriminatory conditions under the
supposedly altruist conduct of the Programs. For instance, Chris and JM, two male Filipino
trainees, describe their everyday lives in Japan as if “[they] are in a jail”. In August 2006, Cui,
the above-mentioned Chinese trainee in Kisarazu City, killed the chief director of an agricultural
cooperative association, which was the receiving organization that had arranged his training in
Japan, and injured two other staff members.81 According to the details of the case that were
disclosed during the court trials,82 after arriving in Japan, he realized that his “wage” was lower
than he expected, and he requested the receiving organization to re-arrange his training. When
the chief director of the organization pretended to accept his appeal while conspiring to
forcefully deport him back to China, he responded to this plot with knife in the face of fears of
losing his guarantee deposit. After the first hearing, the defendant was sentenced to seventeen
years in prison. He was eventually transferred from the “jail-like” everyday life of being a trainee
to a real jail.
Thus, the successive deregulation of the Training Programs and their stated objective of
“technology transfer” have made it possible for these programs to function as the highly
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controlled short-term rotating supply mechanism of “cheap” unskilled migrant labour. While the
Japanese state continuously emphasizes the principal of the Training Programs as international
aid despite their phony operations, these Programs tend to be recognised by official counterparts
in the Global South as the important component of their neoliberal development strategies. The
narrative of Yun, a Chinese female who completed her three-year training at the garment
company in Ibaragi (another suburb of Tokyo), clearly shows her lack of awareness about the
stated purpose of Japan’s Training Programs:
I wanted to go to work in Japan, because I wanted to earn more money. I liked the
study, but I could not go to higher school on my parents’ money. So, I wanted to
obtain money by working in Japan to go to higher school and to support my
brothers’ education…. When I came through the Training Programs to Japan, I
had no ideas about the meanings of “trainee” and “technical intern.”
She remarks that a “trainee” coming to Japan is called officially dagong in Chinese, which
exactly means “overseas migrant workers.” In fact, according to Wang Yanzhang, the dispatch of
trainees to Japan is added to the official statistics of transnational labour exports in China.83
Contextually, what is crucial to further note here is that in 2001, the Vietnamese state
institutionalised the system of collecting deposits from trainees going to Japan, in the name of
preventing them from escaping from their Training Programs but in practice mainly for
effectively executing its neoliberal projects of dispatching workers abroad while tightly
maintaining Vietnamese trainees’ links to their home country. 84 For Vietnam as well as the
Philippines (which will be discussed below), transnational labour outflows and remittances have
played more important roles than foreign direct investment and foreign aid programmes in their
national economies for the purposes of tackling the problems of unemployment and the lack of
foreign exchange. In this context, state officials in trainee-sending countries widely perceive
Japan’s Training Programs as the important part of their capital-led migration-as-development
strategies.
In sum, the institutionalization of the privatized regulatory regime under the conduct of Japan’s
Training Programs, endorsed by the neoliberal development strategies of trainee-sending states,
has facilitated the production of space for the commodification of “cheap” and precarious
migrant labour under the name of Japan’s “international aid project.” However, especially since
the above-mentioned Kisarazu incident, the controversial operations of the Training Programs
increasingly commanded public attention as sensational themes. The widely reported violations
of trainees’ human rights prompted a variety of governmental and nongovernmental
organizations within and outside Japan to claim that the Training Programs often degenerated
into fertile soil for “human trafficking” and contemporary “slave-like” conditions.85 Accounting
for nationally and internationally mobilized criticisms against the Training Programs as well as
the proposals to further expand these Programs by Japan’s business leaders of Nihon Keidanren,
the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare (MHLW),86 the Japanese state revised them in 2010. As a result of this revision, trainees
even at their first year come to be regard as the “apprentices” who are protected under Japan’s
labour-related laws, such as the Labour Standards Law and the Minimum Wage Act.
This reform can be considered one step forward for the aim of “enhancing the protection of
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trainees,”87 but it appears to be only ad hoc measures to cope with contradictions deeply rooted
in the capita-driven operations of the Training Programs that intensify the commodification of
trainees. Like the Kisarazu incident that took place prior to the 2010 revision of the Training
Programs, Chen, a male Chinese trainee working at a fish-processing firm in Etajima City,
Hiroshima, was arrested for allegedly murdering the firm’s owner and its Japanese colleague as
well as six others “due to troubled relations with them” on March 14, 2013.88 Though the details
of this case have not yet been disclosed, it seemingly suggests that the partial reform of the
Training Programs fails to recognize the ways in which the deregulation of the Programs, which
represents as one of new constitutional moments of primitive accumulation within the neoliberal
restructuring of Japan’s labour immigration regime, has made trainees as extremely precarious
and unprotected subjects in Japan while severely constraining their political agency to contest
and negotiate the coercive structures of their everyday training practices.

Filipino Care Workers under the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
Together with the acceptance of foreign trainees under the increasingly privatized and expanded
conduct of the Training Programs, the introduction of Filipino “care” workers to the Japanese
labour market through the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) is
remarkable as the neoliberal restructuring of the Japanese labour immigration regime. Similar to
Japan’s previous free trade treaties with Singapore, Mexico and Malaysia, the JPEPA mainly
concerns tariff reduction to facilitate bilateral exchanges of goods and services. 89 Yet, its
distinctive feature is to facilitate the movement of “natural persons” and, more specifically, to
allow the Philippines to send up to 400 nurses and 600 care workers into Japan over a period of
two years. The conclusion of the JPEPA on September 9, 2006, was described in the Japanese
media as “[a] new step toward opening Japan’s labour market”.90 Indeed, the Japanese state has
signed a similar Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Indonesia, which includes the
same clause, permitting Indonesian nurses and care workers to work in Japan.91 Further, it is
currently discussing the possibility for the reception of Thai care workers through the recently
ratified EPA with Thailand.92 The inflow of migrant care workers to the Japanese labour market
has accelerated heated debates over how to tackle the acute demand for elder care in the context
of a historically unprecedented expansion of the aging population.
As feminist historical materialists argue, the neoliberal reconfigurations of capitalist relations of
production and social reproduction have not only ontologically reorganized the gender order,93
but also, in particular, created what Joya Misra et al. call the “globalization of care work”,94 that
is, the gendered, racialized and classed “international division of reproductive labour” through
the migration of mainly female workers from the global “South” to “North.” 95 The reprivatization of social reproduction and women’s greater participation in the paid labour market,
together with the aging population in highly industrialized societies, have led to a rapid growth in
the market provisioning of social reproduction needs.
What is prominent in this context is that the commodified supply of reproductive labour has been
intensified by the rise of “care deficits” (a lack of paid care or affordable paid care as well as a
lack of informal, family care) and has led to a dramatic proliferation in the cross-border
migration of care workers. The transnational mobility of predominantly female migrants for
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employment in care-giving jobs, with many becoming domestic workers, has accelerated the
“feminization of international migration”96 and has attracted a great deal of research attention.97
With this global trend in mind, I here illuminate how the JPEPA, as an embodiment of new
constitutional moments of primitive accumulation, not only creates a space for the escalating
commodification of migrant care labour but also constitutes Filipino workers as precarious
subjects in the Japanese labour market.
According to the general remarks of the JPEPA, the main objective of the reception of Filipino
care workers to Japan is to contribute to the shared development of medical and social welfare in
both nations. 98 Since the JPEPA does not set up the system to mutually recognize national
licenses, these Filipinos are the candidates for kaigo fukushishi (certified care workers) in
Japan.99 They must have graduated with a four-year university degree and, in addition, in most
cases they must have received a care-giver certificate issued by the Technical Education and
Skills Development Authority (TESDA) in the Philippines.100 The candidates selected by the
Philippine state agencies have to enrol in a six-month program that is composed of language
education and care-giving preparation in Japan. The costs of this training are covered by Japan’s
official development assistance fund. After this instruction, they undertake on-the-job training
(OJT) for a maximum of four years, by signing employment contracts with the care institutions
approved by a semi-governmental organization, the Japan International Corporation of Welfare
Services (JICWELS). Upon completing the three-year OJT, they take Japan’s national license
examination in Japanese. After passing the examination, Filipino candidates are able to work in
Japan as kaigo fukushishi for another three years (which is renewable). However, those who fail
must leave Japan by the end of their four-year visa terms.
Elsewhere I demonstrate how the Japanese and Philippine states’ discourses that both regard care
labour as a commodity stress the introduction of Filipino care labour in Japan under the JPEPA
as Japan’s “special gift” toward “innately gifted” Filipino workers. 101 For the Japanese state
officials, the JPEPA is deemed a crucial economic policy to make up its delay within economic
agglomerations developing in East Asia, largely led by China’s cooperation with the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations.102 Yet, there have been conflicting views between state ministries
regarding the “movements of people,” particularly those of care workers, in this framework.
Viewing the successful establishment of the EPAs with its neighbouring Asian states as vital in
sustaining Japan’s global competitiveness, the METI has proposed the creation of a mutual
recognition system for care workers’ qualifications with the aim of facilitating the flows of such
workers.103 The expansion of the EPAs and the active acceptance of migrant care labour to Japan
is also advocated by the business leaders in Nihon Keidanren to manage growing demands for
elder care work.104
In contrast, with a denial of labour shortage in Japan’s care-giving sector, the MHLW has
claimed that the inflows of migrant care workers to Japan must be confined to the extent that
they will not have any negative impact on the Japanese labour market.105 Because this stance
dominated the central government apparatus in concluding the JPEPA and finalizing the abovementioned procedure, the introduction of Filipino care workers has been considered Japan’s
“exceptional” political compromise in accommodating the overall parameters of the JPEPA.
For the MHLW that denies the necessity of migrant care labour, its primary goal is to “secure
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care workers domestically” by mobilizing the potential labourers who hold certificates but do not
currently engage in care-giving jobs and improving working conditions in this sector.106 Yet, the
high presence of the elderly along with the future trend of their rapidly expanding share in
Japan’s total population has sharply escalated needs for care workers. 107 Reflecting this
condition, as Nobue Suzuki notes, the MHLW’s viewpoint is based on the idea that caring for the
elderly is a familial obligation, underpinned by the institutional gender division of labour –
women as primary care providers working out of “love” in families – which has played an
instrumental role in Japan’s post-war economic growth.108
Whilst the sway of this belief still remains in Japan’s recent policy reforms for the reprivatization of care work, since the late 1980s the state has recognized the rise of the nuclear
family and the growing feminization of labour. 109 The Japanese state has then paradoxically
expedited a readjustment from family-based to socially shared care provision for the elderly. This
discourse of the “socialization of care” makes the practices of care-giving socially visible as paid
labour and serves as a motivating force behind their marketization, formalized with the long-term
care insurance (LTCI) system begun in 2000.110
The implementation of LTCI aims to offer diversified and sufficient elder care services by urging
deregulation in the welfare sector and encouraging the entry of private companies into the care
service industry.111 Mariko Adachi’s scrutiny of the LTCI within the neoliberal restructuring of
Japan’s political economy alleges that its essential motive is not institutionalizing a sustainable
system of elder care provision but decreasing public expenses of medical care insurance to
achieve a balanced budget.112 With the launch of the LTCI, the accelerated commodification of
care labour in the capitalist market has deteriorated the working conditions in the care-giving
sector, socially devalued as feminized reproductive jobs and in association with the image of 3K
jobs.113 The marketization of care work, due to its labour-intensive characteristic, has induced the
utilization of “flexible” low-wage part-time and contract workers (mainly female and young
ones) to reduce labour costs, augmenting precarious and insecure employment. These trends,
together with the physical and mental requirements for the supply of “high-quality” care services
in market competition under conditions of stagnating or even declining wages, have resulted in
very high turnover rates among care workers (20.2 percent in 2006, which is outstanding, as
compared with other sectors). 114 Managers and workers at care institutions have accentuated
their understaffed working conditions. Hence, there is a striking gap between the state’s claim of
“securing care labour domestically” and the severely impending labour shortages in the
(re)privatized care work within dramatic demographic changes.
Under such a shift toward the neoliberal capital-oriented reorganization of social reproduction
and care industry, the scheme outlined in the JPEPA appears to initiate the reception of
commodified migrant labour largely on a temporary basis. Of crucial importance is the
stipulation that Filipino candidates must acquire Japan’s kaigo fukushishi certificate to work after
their initial four-year term. While it is doubtful whether the intensive six-month language
training in Japan would sufficiently equip these Filipinos to work in Japanese-speaking caregiving environments, what is a more critical question is whether these workers are able to pass
the written exam in Japanese: in 2006 its pass rate was only 47 per cent even among Japanese
nationals.115 Although the introduction of Filipino care labour to Japan under the JPEPA could be
regarded as increasing migration and settlement, 116 this prerequisite creates extremely high
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barriers, potentially preventing most of Filipinos from settling in Japan. That is, the JPEPA has
actually created a receiving procedure that compels Filipino workers to become the sources of
flexible and “cheap” labour, especially without Japanese licenses, to ameliorate the immanent
care labour needs.
Furthermore, the commodification of Filipino care labour under the JPEPA scheme has been
reinforced by the Philippine state’s perception of the opening of Japan’s labour market as a
“new” means to earn Japanese currency that is essential in sustaining the national economy.117
Since the 1980s, the Philippines has been known for the rising outflows of care workers and
nurses, prompting Rhacel Salazar Parreñas to note that “[c]are is now the country’s primary
export.”118 Within the neoliberal shift in the Philippine state’s transnational labour deployment
strategy that emphasizes the “protection of overseas Filipino workers” through the
“professionalization of their occupations,” which in turn secures the inflows of foreign currency
to its national economy, the government standardized the national certificate for “care-giver” in
2002. Here, Ruri Ito et al. expose how the discourse of the “innate gift” of Filipinos to care has
been penetrated into the Philippine state’s attempts to both “professionalize” care-giving jobs
that are deemed predominantly “unskilled” and to turn care-giving work performed by Filipinos
into an international commodity. 119 Put differently, the Philippine state is enthusiastic to
professionalize care-giving work so as to enable the commercialization of Filipino care-givers as
an internationally deployable labour. It has done so through disseminating an image of Filipinos
as “family-minded” and “gentle” and as individuals who possess inherent ability to provide
“high-quality” care.
Thus, the transfer of Filipino care workers to Japan under the capital driven framework of the
JPEPA constitutes these Filipinos as “cheap” workers and precarious subjects in the Japanese
labour market. If the inflows of migrant care labour to Japan are expanded through Japan’s EPAs
with Thailand and other states, 120 the JPEPA scheme can be arguably seen as a basis for
systematically establishing the short-term rotating supply of commodified migrant care labour to
fill Japan’s impending vacuum in the gendered and socially “unfavourable” care provisioning
sector.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has developed the notion of the new constitutional moments of primitive
accumulation to explore the dynamics of capital-driven reforms to the governance of global
labour migration. Particularly focusing on the neoliberal restructuring of the Japanese
immigration regime since the 1990s, it has drawn attention to: (1) The acceptance of trainees
under the deregulated operations of Japan’s Training Programs; and (2) The introduction of
Filipino care worker to Japan under the scheme of the JPEPA. The analysis of these two cases as
the embodiment of the new constitutional moments in the longue durée of primitive
accumulation has showed the ways in which these moments have not only produced the social
spaces for the commodification of migrant labour but also constituted migrant workers as
precarious subjects in the Japanese labour market. It has also highlighted the ways in which these
policies are reinforced by the neoliberal strategies of migration-as-development among laboursending states in the Global South.
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As this study has showed, the capital-led reforms in the regulatory regimes over the global flows
of labour tend to sharply constrain the political agency of migrant workers to resist and
(re)negotiate their severely exploitative and discriminatory condition of living and working in the
host societies. Nevertheless, De Angelis’ renewed understanding of primitive accumulation aptly
emphasizes social contestations and struggles as constitutive and ongoing features of capitalist
social relations of (re)production. In this light, a crucial avenue for future research is to not
simply presuppose migrant workers as “powerless” and passive recipients of state policies, but
rather to explore their everyday struggles as political agents who play an important role in
shaping the natures of the labour market and immigration regimes in the host societies even at
the most subaltern level. In so doing it is vital to pursue possibilities to go beyond the coercive
and oppressive structure of neoliberal regulatory regimes in order to develop more socially just
forms of the governance of global labour mobility.
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